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Abstract
Consider an election between two candidates in which the voters’ choices are random and independent
and the probability of a voter choosing the first candidate is p > 1/2. Condorcet’s Jury Theorem which
he derived from the weak law of large numbers asserts that if the number of voters tends to infinity then
the probability that the first candidate will be elected tends to one. The notion of influence of a voter or its
voting power is relevant for extensions of the weak law of large numbers for voting rules which are more
general than simple majority. In this paper we point out two different ways to extend the classical notions
of voting power and influences to arbitrary probability distributions. The extension relevant to us is the
“effect” of a voter, which is a weighted version of the correlation between the voter’s vote and the election’s
outcomes. We prove an extension of the weak law of large numbers to weighted majority games when all
individual effects are small and show that this result does not apply to any voting rule which is not based on
weighted majority.
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Consider a biased coin for which the probability for a “head” is p > 1/2. The weak law of
large numbers asserts that if you flip the coin n times then the probability that you will see more
heads than tails tends to one as n tends to ∞. Understanding the scope of the weak law of large
numbers when the coin flips are not independent or when we consider more complicated events
than the event “to see more heads than tails,” has attracted considerable attention.
Our motivation came from a game theoretic interpretation: Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (see
[13]) asserts that in an election between two candidates, say Alice and Bob, if every voter votes
for Alice with probability p > 1/2 and for Bob with probability 1 − p and if these votes are
independent, then as the number of voters tends to infinity the probability that Alice will be
elected tends to one. Condorcet’s Jury Theorem can be interpreted as saying that even if agents
receive very poor (independent) signals indicating which decision is correct, majority voting
will nevertheless result in the correct decision being taken with a high probability if there are
enough agents (and each agent votes according to the signal he receives). This phenomenon is
referred to as asymptotically complete aggregation of information and it plays an important role
in theoretical economics.
To describe a more general settings consider the following framework. Let f : {0,1}n → {0,1}
be a Boolean function. We will assume that f is
• monotone non-decreasing, i.e.,
(∀i: xi  yi) ⇒ f (x1, . . . , xn) f (y1, . . . , yn),
• and anti-symmetric, i.e.,
f (1 − x1,1 − x2, . . . ,1 − xn) = 1 − f (x1, x2, . . . , xn).
Let μp denote the product probability measure on {0,1}n defined by
μp[x1, x2, . . . , xn] = pk(1 − p)n−k, (1)
where k = x1 + x2 + . . . + xn. For a function f , let μp[f ] denote the expected value of f
according to the probability distribution μp . Note that if f is Boolean, then
μp[f ] = μp
[
(x1, x2, . . . , xn): f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 1
]
. (2)
We would like to find conditions that guarantee that for a fixed p > 1/2, μp[f ] is close
to 1. Clearly it is not sufficient that n is large since even if f is defined on many variables,
it may actually depend only on a few of them. The notion of influence of a variable which is
closely related to notions of voting power is important in understanding information aggregation
when we consider general Boolean functions and the product probability measure μp . Boolean
functions can describe voting rules and are referred to in the game theoretic literature as simple
games. Anti-symmetric Boolean functions are called strong simple games.
For a Boolean function f and x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ {0,1}n we say that the kth variable is
pivotal for f if f (x1, . . . , xk−1,0, xk+1, . . . , xn) 	= f (x1, . . . , xk−1,1, xk+1, . . . , xn).
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function that we consider as a voting rule. As before, we denote by μ[f ] the expected value of f
with respect to the probability distribution μ. When f is Boolean, we have, analogously to (2),
μ[f ] = μ[(x1, x2, . . . , xn): f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 1].
Define the influence or the voting power of the kth variable as the probability that the kth variable
is pivotal. Denote by Iμk (f ) the influence of the kth variable for the Boolean function f , w.r.t.
the distribution μ. In other words,
I
μ
k (f ) = μ
[
(x1, . . . , xn): f (x1, . . . , xk−1,0, xk+1, . . . , xn)
	= f (x1, . . . , xk−1,1, xk+1, . . . , xn)
]
. (3)
The notion of influence is closely related to classical notions of voting powers. The Banzhaf
power index of k in f is Iμ1/2k (f ) and the Shapley–Shubik power index of k in f is, by a
theorem of Owen [10], ∫ 10 Iμpk (f ) dp. In [2] the authors proposed to define the voting power as
the probability to be pivotal based on realistic assumptions on individual voting distributions,
and discuss advantages and drawbacks of this approach.
For product probability spaces, various results of Russo, Talagrand, Friedgut and Kalai assert
that for every p > 1/2 sufficiently small influences suffice to guarantee that μp[f ] is close to 1.
The latest such result is the following.
Theorem 1.1. (Kalai [4]) For every p > 1/2 and  > 0 there is δ > 0 such that the following
holds. If f is a monotone antisymmetric Boolean function such that Iμpk (f ) < δ for every k, then
μp[f ] 1 − .
Remark. The conclusion of Theorem 1.1 remains valid if we replace Iμpk (f ) by the Banzhaf
power index of k in f or by the Shapley–Shubik power index. For the Shapley–Shubik power
index a reverse implication also holds, see [4]. We choose here a version which relies only on
a single probability distribution μp and hence is more convenient for extensions to arbitrary
probability distributions.
The purpose of this paper is to study extensions of the weak law of large numbers in the
context of general probability distributions. Let μ be a probability distribution on {0,1}n. When
μ is not a product measure the notion of influence can be extended in different way compared
to the above. Define the effect of the kth variable on the Boolean function f as the difference
between the expected value of f (x1, . . . , xn) conditioned on xk = 1 and the expected value of
f (x1, . . . , xn) conditioned on xk = 0, and denote by eμk [f ] the effect of the kth variable for the
Boolean function f , w.r.t. the distribution μ. More precisely,
e
μ
k [f ] = μ
[
f (X1, . . . ,Xn) | Xk = 1
]− μ[f (X1, . . . ,Xn) | Xk = 0]. (4)
The effect is undefined if the probability that Xk = 1 is 0 or 1. Writing μ[Xk] = p and Yk =
Xk − p, we get
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[
f (X1, . . . ,Xn),Xk
]= μ[f (X1, . . . ,Xn)Yk]
= pμ[(1 − p)f | Xk = 1]+ (1 − p)μ[−pf | Xk = 0]
= p(1 − p)eμk [f ]
so that the effect may be interpreted as a normalized form of the correlation between the individ-
ual vote and the election’s outcome.
When μ represents a product probability measure (1), the effect (4) and the influence (3)
coincide, but in general this is not the case. For instance, for general μ the effect may be negative
(see item (i) in Section 2) while the influence is of course always non-negative.
It is not true that for general probability distributions and general f , small influences implies
aggregation of information. Our main result is that small effects implies aggregation of informa-
tion for the particular case of weighted majority functions. Moreover, unlike in Theorem 1.1, the
bounds in our main result are rather realistic.
We call monotone antisymmetric function f a weighted majority function if there exist non-
negative weights w1, . . . ,wn, not all zero such that f (x1, . . . , xn) = 1 if ∑ni=1 wi(2xi − 1) > 0
and f (x1, . . . , xn) = 0 if ∑ni=1 wi(2xi − 1) < 0. If n is odd and wi = 1 for every i, f is called
the majority function (or simple majority).
Note that in our definition of a weighted majority function, if ∑wi(2xi − 1) = 0 then the
value of f (x) may be either 0 or 1 as long as f is monotone and anti-symmetric. This is different
from the traditional definition of a weighted majority (or threshold) function where f (x) = 1 iff∑
wi(2xi − 1) > 0 and f (x) = 0 iff ∑wi(2xi − 1) < 0.
Thus for example, any monotone anti-symmetric function f : {0,1}n → {0,1} satisfying
f (x) = 1 when x1 = x2 = 1 and f (x) = 0 when x1 = x2 = 0 is a weighted majority function
(taking w1 = w2 = 1 and w3 = · · · = wn = 0) according to our definition. This example demon-
strates that under our definition of weighted majority functions, there are at least 22n−2 weighted
majority functions. Under the traditional definition the number of weighted majority functions is
at most 2n2 [5,12].
Of particular interest are voting schemes where all the voters have the same power. One such
case is when f is invariant under a transitive group of permutations. In other words there exists a
group of permutation Γ ⊂ Sn such that f (x1, . . . , xn) = f (xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n)) for all σ ∈ Γ and for
all 1 i, j  n there exists σ ∈ Γ such that σ(i) = j ; here Sn denotes the full permutation group
on n elements. One instructive example is the simple majority function when n is odd which is
invariant under Sn; another is the recursive majority function RMk, which is defined for n = k
where k is odd. The definition is by induction. RMk,1 is just the majority function on k bits and
RMk,+1(x1, . . . , xk+1) = RMk,1
(
RMk,(x1, . . . , xk), . . . ,RMk,(xk+1−k+1, . . . , xk+1)
)
.
See Fig. 1.
Theorem 1.2.
(a) For every p > 12 and  > 0 there exists a δ = δ(p, ) > 0 such that for every weighted
majority function f and any distribution μ on {0,1}n, if eμk [f ] δ and μ[Xk = 1] p for
all k then μ[f ] 1 − .
In other words, if the effect of each variable is at most δ and the probability that each variable
is 1 is at least p, then f = 1 with μ-probability at least 1 − .
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(b) If f is a monotone anti-symmetric function but not a weighted majority function, then there
exists a probability distribution μ such that μ[Xk = 1] > 1/2 for all k, yet μ[f ] = 0 and
e
μ
k [f ] = 0 for all k.
In other words, if f is not a weighted majority function, then there is a probability measure
μ for which f = 0 with μ-probability 1, yet μ[Xk = 1] > 12 for all k. (Since f is constant
according to the measure μ, all the effects are 0 in this case.)
(c) If f is monotone anti-symmetric and invariant under a transitive group, but is not the (sim-
ple) majority function, then there exists a probability distribution μ such that μ[Xk = 1] >
1/2 for all k, yet μ[f ] = 0 and eμk [f ] = 0 for all k.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we will discuss the notions of
aggregation of information, influences and effects for general probability distributions on {0,1}n.
We will try to examine what aggregation of information means when we do not suppose that the
probability distribution for the voter’s behavior is a product distribution. We also examine to what
extent our technical notion of “effects” represent real influence in the non-technical sense of the
words. Section 3 contains the proof of our theorem. Finally, in Section 4, we present several
natural problems as well as an example showing that Theorem 1.1 does not extend to arbitrary
Boolean monotone functions even for the restricted class of FKG-distributions.
2. Voting games, information aggregation and notions of influence
Consider the following scenario. Every agent k receives a single bit of information si which
is either ‘Vote for Alice’ or ‘Vote for Bob’ and these signals are independent. When Alice is the
better candidate the probability of receiving the signal ‘Vote for Alice’ is p > 1/2. Condorcet’s
Jury Theorem deals with the case that the voters vote precisely as the signal dictates and the
decision is made according to the simple majority rule. It asserts that for every p > 1/2 the
better candidate will be elected with probability tending to one as the number of agents tends to
infinity. Thus the majority rule allows to reveal the actual state of the world from rather weak
individual signals.
A major problem in the economic and political interpretation of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem
and its extensions arises from the fact that the basic assumption of probability independence
among voters is quite unrealistic. Without the assumption of independence, Condorcet’s Jury
Theorem as stated is no longer true, and it will no longer be the case that when each individual
votes for Alice with probability p > 1/2, Alice will win with a high probability.
To see this, consider the following example. As before, we have an election between Alice
and Bob, with Alice being the superior candidate. The distribution of signals s1, s2, . . . , sn will
be biased towards Alice as follows: Let p = 1/2 + /2, where  is small. First choose at random
a number t uniformly in the interval [,1]. Then, independently for each i, choose the ith voter
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Alice. In this case, the probability for each individual signal si being ‘1’ is p but the individual
signals are not independent. The probability that Alice will win is below 12(1−) for any number
of voters. This is because we can think of t being chosen in two stages. First we toss a coin which
is ‘H’ with probability /(1 − ). If the coin is ‘H’, then t is chosen uniformly in the interval
[1 − ,1]. This contributes to the probability that Alice wins at most /(1 − ). If the coin is ‘T’
then t is chosen uniformly in the interval [,1 − ]. Here by symmetry, Alice and Bob have the
same chance of winning. Thus the contribution to the probability that Alice will win from this
case is 1−22(1−) . Thus the overall probability that Alice will win is at most
1−2
2(1−) + 1− = 12(1−) .
An even more extreme example is the case in which all voters vote in the same way: With
probability p they all vote for Alice and with probability 1 − p they all vote for Bob. Alice will
be elected with probability p regardless of the number of voters when the election is based on
simple majority and for every other simple game.
These simple examples will help us to examine the notions of information aggregation and
influence in the case when the assumption of probability independence is dropped. The problem
in these examples is not in the way information aggregates but in the quality of the information
to start with. This assertion can be formalized as follows. Suppose that Alice and Bob are given
an a-priori probability 1/2 of being the superior candidate. We assume that the distribution of
voters for Bob given that Bob is the superior candidate is the same as the distribution of voters
for Alice given that Alice is the superior candidate. Thus in the first example above if Bob is
superior then we choose t uniformly in [,1] and then each voter votes for Bob independently
with probability t . In the second example if Bob is superior, then all voters will vote for Bob with
probability p.
We now wish to decide between the hypothesis that Alice is the superior and the hypothesis
that Bob is the superior candidate given the entire vector of individual signals. It is intuitively
clear and easy to prove using the Neyman–Pearson Lemma that in both cases described above
one should guess that Alice is superior to Bob exactly when the majority of voters voted for
Alice. However, in both examples above the probability that the majority will vote Alice when
Alice is superior is bounded away from 1 and tends to 1/2 as p does.
When we consider general distributions, the issue is to understand what information we can
derive on the superior alternative from knowing the signals of all individuals and how the voting
mechanism extracts this information. Note that in the examples we considered above the indi-
vidual effects are large while the individual influences are small. This is most transparent in the
second example where if f is the majority function and n  3, then all of the influences are 0,
while the effect of all voters are 1. Theorem 1.2 asserts that for the weighted majority voting
rule (and only for these rules) for every probability measure on {0,1}n, small individual effects
implies asymptotically complete aggregation of information.
Let us next consider the notion of influence without probability independence. The notion of
pivotal variables (or players) and influence is of technical importance in various areas of math-
ematics, computer science and economics, and is also of a considerable conceptual importance.
The voting power index of Banzhaf is based on measuring the influence with respect to the
uniform distribution. The Shapley–Shubik power index can also be based on the influence with
respect to another distribution. Conceptual understanding of voting power in situations where the
voters’ behavior is not independent is of great interest. In [2] the authors propose to define the
voting power as the probability to be pivotal based on realistic assumptions on individual voting
distributions. We make the following remarks on the notion of individual effects which is quite a
different extension of influence and voting power measures to arbitrary probability distributions.
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a voter who always votes for the candidate who is the underdog in the election polls and
also for a committee member who antagonizes the other members of the committee. (On
the other hand, the influence of an agent is always nonnegative, because it is defined as a
probability.)
(ii) A dummy (a voter k which is never pivotal) has zero influence (with respect to every prob-
ability distribution). He may nevertheless have a large effect, such as if he always votes
for the candidate who is expected to win according to election polls. In real life, this will
also be the case for an observer on a committee without the right to vote but who is likely
to convince the committee of his opinion. Note that in the first case we do not attribute to
that player real “influence” in the (non-technical) English sense of the word, while in the
second case we would consider him “influential.” The uncertainty in interpreting effects as
real “influences” is genuine.
(iii) What is the motivation for a voter to vote, given the small probability for him to be pivotal?
This is a social dilemma, related to, e.g., the so-called tragedy of the commons, and has been
extensively discussed in the political science and philosophy literature. (Sometimes the term
voting paradox has been used for this dilemma, but may cause some confusion as the same
term is used also for Condorcet’s famous observation that when three or more choices are
available, the majority preference between them need not be transitive.) A possible solution
to the dilemma may lie in the fact that in real-life elections, individual effects tend to be
large, namely bounded away from zero regardless of the size of the society. The uncertainty
in regarding effects as real “influence” may suggest that it is the effect of an agent rather
than his influence which is related to his “satisfaction” with the social decision process and
his ability to identify with the collective choice.
3. Proof of Theorem 1.2
3.1. Part (a) of the theorem
We begin this section by providing a probabilistic proof of the following result, which clearly
implies Theorem 1.2 (a).
Lemma 3.1. Let (wi)ni=1 be non-negative weights which are not all 0, let 0 < q < 1, and let
f : {0,1}n → {0,1} be a function which satisfies
f =
{
1 if ∑ni=1(2xi − 2q)wi > 0,
0 if ∑ni=1(2xi − 2q)wi < 0.
Write W =∑ni=1 wi . Suppose furthermore that p > q and that μ is a probability measure satis-
fying μ[Xi] = pi and
n∑
wipi = pW (5)i=1
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n∑
i=1
wipi(1 − pi)eμi [f ] p(1 − p)δW. (6)
Then
μ[f ] 1 − δp(1 − p)
p − q .
(Note that (5) holds if μ[Xi] = p for all i, and that (6) holds if μ[Xi] = p and eμi [f ] δ for
all i, so that indeed Theorem 1.2 (a) follows.)
Proof. Let X =∑ni=1(2Xi − 2q)wi . We start by noting that μ[X] = (2p − 2q)W .
We let g = 1 − f and Yi = pi − Xi , so that
μ[Yig] = Covμ[f,Xi] = pi(1 − pi)eμi [f ].
Note that conditioned on g = 1, ∑ni=1(2Xi − 2q)wi  0 and therefore ∑ni=1 wiYi 
(p − q)W . It follows that
μ
[(
n∑
i=1
wiYi
)
g(X1, . . . ,Xn)
]
 (p − q)Wμ[g]
= (p − q)W (1 − μ[f ]). (7)
On the other hand,
μ
[(
n∑
i=1
wiYi
)
g(X1, . . . ,Xn)
]
=
n∑
i=1
wiμ
[
Yig(X1, . . . ,Xn)
]
=
n∑
i=1
wipi(1 − pi)eμi [f ]
 p(1 − p)δW. (8)
Combining (7) and (8), we get that
μ[f ] 1 −
∑n
i=1 wipi(1 − pi)eμi [f ]
(p − q)W
 1 − δp(1 − p)
p − q . 
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We note that part (c) of Theorem 1.2 follows immediately from part (b), because the only
weighted majority function that is invariant under a transitive group, is simple majority. Let us
nevertheless begin by giving an independent and simple proof of part (c). Note that if f is not
the majority function then there is a vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ {0,1}n such that f (x) = 0 and
x1 + x2 + · · · + xn > n/2. Then we can simply take μ to be uniform probability distribution on
the orbit of x under Γ . It is then easy to see that μ[Xk] > 1/2 for all k and that μ[f = 0] = 1.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 1.2 (b). We will show that if f is not a weighted majority
function, then there exists a measure μ satisfying μ[Xk] > 1/2 for all k and μ[f = 0] = 1.
Define [n] = {1,2, . . . , n}. For S ⊂ [n] put xS = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) where xi = 1 if and only if
i ∈ S. Let H be a hypergraph whose set of vertices is [n] and whose edges are subsets S of [n]
such that f (xS) = 0. Let τ ∗ = τ ∗(H) be the fractional cover number of H , i.e., the infimum
over all ν : {0,1}n →R of ∑S∈H ν[xS], under the condition that ν(xS) 0 for every S ∈ H and∑
S∈H,k∈S ν[xS]  1 for all k. We get τ ∗ = ∞ if there are no ν satisfying the two conditions
above (note that this is the case if f (x) = x1, say).
If τ ∗ < 2, then we can define μ[S] = 0 if f (S) = 1 and μ[S] = ν(S)/τ ∗ when f (S) = 0. The
probability measure μ satisfies that
∑
S:k∈S,f (S)=0
μ(xS) 1/τ ∗ > 1/2
for every k and μ[f = 0] = 1 as stated in the theorem. Therefore, in order to prove part (b) of
the theorem, it only remains to analyze the case τ ∗  2.
A well-known equivalent (by linear programming duality) definition of τ ∗ is as the supremum
of
∑n
i=1 wi under the condition that wk  0 for k = 1,2, . . . , n and
∑{wi : i ∈ S} 1 for every
S ∈ H .
Assume first τ ∗ > 2. In this case we can find wi ’s such that
∑
i wi > 2 and f (x1, . . . , xn) = 1
if
∑
wixi > 1. By slightly perturbing the wi we may assume that for all x ∈ {0,1}n it holds
that
∑
i wixi 	= 12
∑
i wi in addition to the properties that
∑
i wi > 2 and f (x1, . . . , xn) = 1 if∑
wixi > 1. Let g(x) = 1 if ∑i wixi > 12 ∑i wi and g(x) = 0 if ∑i wixi < 12 ∑i wi . Then g
is anti-symmetric and f = 0 ⇒ g = 0. It follows that f = g so that f is a weighted majority
function as needed.
The remaining case is where τ ∗ =∑wi = 2. We obtain that f (x1, . . . , xn) = 1 if∑wixi > 1.
Since f is anti-symmetric it follows that f (x1, . . . , xn) = 0 if ∑wixi < 1. The result fol-
lows. 
4. Problems and an additional example
The following problems naturally suggest themselves at this point:
(1) For which class of distributions is it the case that for simple majority small voting power
implies asymptotically complete aggregation of information?
(2) For which class of distributions is it the case that for every monotone Boolean function small
voting power implies asymptotically complete aggregation of information?
(3) For which class of distributions is it the case that for every monotone Boolean function small
individual effects implies asymptotically complete aggregation of information?
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situations is the FKG condition (see [6]). For x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn), define
max(x, y) = (max(x1, y1), . . . ,max(xn, yn))
and
min(x, y) = (min(x1, y1), . . . ,min(xn, yn)).
One definition of FKG measures on {0,1}n goes as follows: A distribution μ on {0,1}n (or onRn)
is called an FKG measure if for every x, y ∈ {0,1}n we have
μ(x)μ(y) μ
(
max(x, y)
)
μ
(
min(x, y)
)
.
The FKG property is a profound notion of non-negative correlations between agents’ signals. It
implies (but is strictly stronger than) the following condition (known as non-negative association,
see [7]): For all increasing real functions f and g, it is the case that E[fg]  E[f ]E[g]. This
is equivalent to the condition that for all increasing events A and B we have that P [AB] 
P [A]P [B]. Under the FKG property if the simple game is monotone, all effects are non-negative.
This form of non-negative correlation is a plausible assumption to make in various contexts
of collective choice. It is easy to see that under the condition of non-negative association all
individual effects are non-negative.
(4) For which class of monotone Boolean functions does small individual effects imply asymp-
totically complete aggregation of information?
In the following subsection, we present an example of an FKG measure and a monotone
Boolean function such that the individual effects are small and yet there is no asymptotically
complete aggregation of information. In this example both the voting scheme and the measure μ
are invariant under a transitive group of permutations.
4.1. Example: FKG without aggregation
The measure μ. We start by describing the measure μ. The measure is given by a Gibbs mea-
sure for the Ising model on the 3-regular tree. See e.g. [3,11]. The measure is defined as follows.
Let Tr = (Vr ,Er) be the r-level 3-regular tree. This is a rooted tree where all internal nodes has
exactly 3 children and all the leaves are at distance exactly r from the root ρ. Let Lr be the set
of leaves of that tree. Note that |Lr | = 3r . Thus in Figure 1 the underlying tree is T2.
We first define a measure ν on the tree {0,1}Vr . In this measure the probability of x is given
by
ν[x] = 1
2
∏
(u,v)∈Er
(
(1 − )1{xu=xv} + 1{xu 	=xv}
)
.
In words, this means that in the measure ν the sign of the root xρ is chosen to be 0 or 1 with
probability 1/2. Then each vertex inherits its parents label with probability θ = 1 − 2 and is
chosen independently otherwise.
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μ[x] =
∑
y:y|Lrx
ν[y]δ|{i:xi=1,yi=0}|(1 − δ)|{i:xi=yi=0}|.
In other words, a configuration of votes according to μ may be obtained by drawing a con-
figuration x according to ν and looking at x|Lr . Then for each of the coordinates of i ∈ Lr
independently, the vote at x is re-sampled to have the value 1 with probability δ. Below we will
sometime abuse notation and write μ for the joint probability distribution of x and y.
Standard results for the Ising model (see, e.g., [3]) imply that μ is an FKG measure. Moreover,
it is easy to see that the measure is invariant under a transitive group and that μ[xi] = (1 + δ)/2
for all i.
The function m. We define the function m as the recursive majority function m = RM3,r .
Clearly, m is monotone, anti-symmetric and invariant under a transitive group.
Claim 4.1. If  = δ  0.01 then μ[m] 1/2 + δ/2 for m = RM3,r and all r .
Proof. The proof below is similar to arguments in [8,9]. Let (yv: v ∈ Vr) be chosen according
to the measure ν. Let (xv: v ∈ Lr) be obtained from yv by re-sampling each of the coordinates
of (yv: v ∈ Lr) to 1 with probability δ. Let (mv: v ∈ Vr) denote the value of the recursive
majority of all (xw: w ∈ Lr(v)), where Lr(v) are all the leaves of T below v. We will show
that μ[m = mρ = 0|yρ = 0]  1 − δ. Since μ[yρ = 0] = 1/2, we conclude that μ[m]  1/2 +
μ[m|yρ = 0]/2 (1 + δ)/2, as needed.
We are interested in the probability that mv = 0 conditioned on yv = 0. It is easy to see that
this probability only depends on the height of v, i.e., on the distance between v and the set of
leaves. We let p(k) denote the probability that mv = 0 conditioned on yv = 0 for a vertex v of
height k.
Clearly, p(0) = 1 − δ. We want to prove by induction that p(k)  1 − δ for all k. Let v be
a node of height k + 1 and w a child of v. Note that conditioned on yv = 0 the probability that
mw = 0 is at least (1 − )p(k) which is at least t = (1 − )(1 − δ) by the induction hypothesis.
Moreover, noting that the values of the majorities of the children of the node v are conditionally
independent given that yv = 0, we conclude that
p(k) t3 + 3t2(1 − t) = 3t2 − 2t3 = t2(3 − 2t).
We need that t2(3 − 2t) 1 − δ or recalling that  = δ: (1 − )4(3 − 2(1 − )2) (1 − ). This
in turn is equivalent to (1 − )3(3 − 2(1 − )2) 1. The function h() = (1 − )3(3 − 2(1 − )2)
has h′() = 10(1 − )4 − 9(1 − )2 = (1 − )2(10(1 − )2 − 9). Therefore h is increasing in the
interval [0,0.01]. Since h(0) = 1 it follows that h() 1 for all   0.01 as needed. 
Our next objective is to bound the effect of a voter at level r . We will prove the following:
Claim 4.2. The measure μ on Tr and the function m = RM3,r satisfy that the effect of each voter
is at most (1 − 2)(r−1)/2 + 2−(r−1)/2.
Proof. The argument here is similar in spirit to an argument in [1]. Let t + s = r where t 
(r−1)/2 and s  (r−1)/2. Fix a leaf voter i. We want to estimate μ[m = 1 | xi = 1]−μ[m = 1 |
O. Häggström et al. / Advances in Applied Mathematics 37 (2006) 112–123 123xi = 0]. Let us denote by μ0 the measure μ conditioned on xi = 0 and by μ1 the measure μ
conditioned on xi = 1.
Let i = v0, v1, . . . , vr = ρ denote the path from i to the root. We first claim that the measures
μ0,μ1 and μ may be coupled in such a way that except with probability (1 − 2)t the only
disagreements between μ0,μ1 and μ are on vertices below vt .
This follows immediately from the random cluster representation of the model. In this repre-
sentation we declare and edge (u, v) open with probability (1 − 2) and closed with probabil-
ity 2. If the edge (u, v) is open then yu = yv , otherwise, the two labels are independent. It is
then clear that we may couple the two measure μ0,μ1 and μ below vt as long as the path from i
to vt contains at least one closed edge. The probability that such an edge does not exist is at most
(1 − 2)t . The proof of the first claim follows.
For each j denote by uj and wj the siblings of vj . We assume that the measures μ0,μ1 and
μ are coupled in such a way that the only disagreements between them are on vertices below vt .
Note that if this is the case, then if the values of m under μ0 and μ1 are different then for
all r > j  t it holds that muj 	= mwj . We wish to bound the μ probability that muj 	= mwj
for r > j  t . We will bounds this probability conditioned on the values (yvj )rj=t . Conditioned
on (yvj )
r
j=t the event muj 	= mwj are independent for different j ’s. Moreover, by the Markov
property, μ[muj 	= mwj | (yvh)rh=t ] = μ[muj 	= mwj | yvj+1]. Finally note that conditioned on
yvj+1 the random variables muj ,mwj are identically distributed and independent. Therefore
μ[muj 	= mwj | yvj+1] max
p∈[0,1]
2p(1 − p) 1/2.
We thus obtain that the μ-probability that muj 	= mwj for r > j  t is at most 2−s . 
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